I think that the Biden Administration is aware of the aspirations of other countries for growth. The Indo-Pacific leg of the strategy, to me, is not aimed at convincing regional states to cut their economic links with China, but to balance this out with US influence so that they are not fully incorporated into a Chinese sphere of influence. Regarding consideration of the needs of other countries more generally: I think this is a tough sell in the US at the moment. Trump's "America First" approach basically dismissed these. The Biden Admin probably has a different view, but it needs to keep domestic support. The text of the recent NSS is littered with statements justifying all kinds of initiatives in terms of their benefits to the American people, and American workers.
This is a uniquely insightful article and I agree with the notion that US has to transcend the domestic and international policy views to start a recalibrated One View approach but it should also put itself in the shoes of other international leaders who are at various points in the spectrum of International Relations. Eg The European Powers fear walk over by either side of the world( Chinese or US). Asian countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, Combodia, Mayanmar want wealth creation on a massive scale (US must find innovative methods to promote wealth in these countries to have their orbits stable against Chinese Security's Gravitational Pull)
India wants to lift it's massive people out of poverty and aspires to have it's "Circle of influence" in its regional area and aspires to be a beacon of new technology around the world. Japan has (i believe) fear of slowly going into history as a international super power as a economy that matters internationally and ultimately culturally. Australia wants to keep its inflated economy at pace and its people happy so it uses Chinese Investments.
Rather than promoting mutual growth, I expect more of the stifling like we saw with Huawei’s 5G suppression in Europe, or with the wedge-driving CHIPS Act. It would be a shame if this behavior artificially creates two systems that countries have to choose between or double-spend on.
This seems likely. The Biden Admin has disclaimed any intent to split the world into mutually competing blocs - probably to dial down exactly this type of concern among allies and nations in the developing world - but US policy points in this direction.
The question is whether the US would be able to enforce such a stance. Germany has moved closer to China economically recently, to try to recoup its economic losses from sanctions on Russia. It will be hard for the USA to demand other states act against their own economic self-interest.
I think that the Biden Administration is aware of the aspirations of other countries for growth. The Indo-Pacific leg of the strategy, to me, is not aimed at convincing regional states to cut their economic links with China, but to balance this out with US influence so that they are not fully incorporated into a Chinese sphere of influence. Regarding consideration of the needs of other countries more generally: I think this is a tough sell in the US at the moment. Trump's "America First" approach basically dismissed these. The Biden Admin probably has a different view, but it needs to keep domestic support. The text of the recent NSS is littered with statements justifying all kinds of initiatives in terms of their benefits to the American people, and American workers.
Hi Robert,
This is a uniquely insightful article and I agree with the notion that US has to transcend the domestic and international policy views to start a recalibrated One View approach but it should also put itself in the shoes of other international leaders who are at various points in the spectrum of International Relations. Eg The European Powers fear walk over by either side of the world( Chinese or US). Asian countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia, Combodia, Mayanmar want wealth creation on a massive scale (US must find innovative methods to promote wealth in these countries to have their orbits stable against Chinese Security's Gravitational Pull)
India wants to lift it's massive people out of poverty and aspires to have it's "Circle of influence" in its regional area and aspires to be a beacon of new technology around the world. Japan has (i believe) fear of slowly going into history as a international super power as a economy that matters internationally and ultimately culturally. Australia wants to keep its inflated economy at pace and its people happy so it uses Chinese Investments.
Rather than promoting mutual growth, I expect more of the stifling like we saw with Huawei’s 5G suppression in Europe, or with the wedge-driving CHIPS Act. It would be a shame if this behavior artificially creates two systems that countries have to choose between or double-spend on.
This seems likely. The Biden Admin has disclaimed any intent to split the world into mutually competing blocs - probably to dial down exactly this type of concern among allies and nations in the developing world - but US policy points in this direction.
The question is whether the US would be able to enforce such a stance. Germany has moved closer to China economically recently, to try to recoup its economic losses from sanctions on Russia. It will be hard for the USA to demand other states act against their own economic self-interest.